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Low-Level Windhear 
LO W-LE VEL WINDSHEAR AND ITS IMPACT ON AIRLINES 
Wayne L. Golding 
ABSTRACT 
The hazards posed by low-levei windshear are an important issue in commercial aviation. Extensive research 
into methods for coping with low-level windshear has been continuing for many years. This paper addresses the issues 
pertaining to low-level wind shear causes, impact on commercial aviation, and initiatives undertaken to prevent low- 
level windshear mishaps today and in the future. 
INTRODUCTION 
Normand "Rock" Sheeren heard jet engines 
screaming andknew the plane was in trouble. As the Boeing 
727 cartwheeled into the ground and burst into flames, he 
heard people screaming, too. The crash, on July 9, 1982, 
killed all 146 people on Pan Am Flight 759 and eight more 
on the ground - two women in their 20s and six children. 
Jolted out of the air by a sudden, intense downdraft and 
ferocious crosswinds, the 95-ton airplane cartwheeled 
through two blocks of the close-knit neighborhood near 
New Orleans' international airport. Twenty years later, it 
remains the worst crash ever caused by wind shear. Thanks 
to better knowledge, training and equipment developed 
partly in response to that crash, the record might stand 
(Mconnaughey, 2002). 
Flight 759 hit the ground during a storm so intense 
that within a short distance, the sounds of the banging, 
slamming, splintering wood and tearing metal merged into 
the booming thunder. John Lavarine, working at his 
insurance office five blocks away, didn't hear it. A phone 
call alerted Lavarine, a Jefferson Parish councilman who 
represented that area on the Kenner City Council. He went 
straight through rain so heavy that vision was drowned for 
blocks. All he could see was wreckage; all he could smell 
was jet he]. The downpour probably kept the fire from 
spreading over about 110 city blocks, he said. As it was, 
eight homes were flattened, another seven too damaged to 
repair. The 154 deaths made it the nation's third-worst crash 
at that time. It remains the nation's worst accident caused by 
windshear (Mconnaughey, 2002). 
What Is Low-Level Windshear? 
Windshears are rapid changes in wind speed andlor 
direction in either the horizontal or vertical direction. We 
know that wind shears can cause significant turbulence. But 
low to the ground, windshears can be killers. Studies on 
windshear accidents have shown that pilots will only have 
from five to 15 seconds of time to react, and react correctly, 
to safely negotiate the hazards. The hazards are rapidly 
changing headwind and tailwind, strong side gusts and 
variable lift on the wings, all during a time when an aircraft 
is most vulnerable (Minor, 2000). 
The causes of windshear are very well known. 
Convective weather with first gusts, downdrafts, 
microbursts, and gravity waves are the most significant 
forms of windshear. Terrain features like mountains, gullies, 
or other topography cause wind flows to change over short 
distances. Man-made obstacles, like a large hangar beside 
the runway, create a changing wind pattern. Fronts and 
storms can create vertical shearing in the atmosphere close 
to the ground. Windshear f?om each of these causes has 
made an impact on some airplane in the last few decades 
(Minor, 2000). 
What is a Microburst? 
A microburst is windshear that is the result of cool 
air pouring from the bottom of a thunderstorm cloud and 
onto the airplane, like an inverted mushroom of air. As a 
jet passes through the downdraft, it first encounters a strong 
headwind, which slows the plane's speed and gives it extra 
lift. But the head wind suddenly diminishes, followed by an 
equally strong tail wind, which causes the jet to lose lift and 
sink. If this occurs during landing or takeoff, when the 
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airplane is only about 100 feet off the ground, a crash can 
result (Rozas, 2002). 
Microbursts can occur anywhere, normally from 
spring through fall in the United States-thunderstorm 
season. They occur most frequently between 1200 and 1800 
hours local time, with maximum occurrence between 1500 
and 1700. Observations have shown that about five percent 
of all thunderstorms are capable of producing a microburst. 
Microbursts are typically only a few hundred to 3000 feet 
across. As a microburst contacts the ground, it usually fans 
out in a radial pattern, which can produce headwind to-- 
tailwind speed differences greater titan 50 knots. Because of 
their small size and rapidly changing wind conditions over 
very small distances, extreme wind shear conditions often 
exist. Most microburst winds intensifL just after ground 
contact and typically dissipate in about 10 to 20 minutes 
(Lawyer, 200 1). 
Different Types of Microbursts 
There are basically two types of microbursts--wet and 
dry. The main distinguishing characteristic between the two 
is the prevailing environment in which they are produced. 
Dry microbursts, as the name implies, develop in an 
extremely dry environment in which moist convection is 
just barely possible. They often occur from the front range 
of the Rocky Mountains to the Western Plateau region. The 
atmosphere is moist at high altitudes, but at lower altitudes 
conditions are exceedingly dry. The process of a dry 
microburst begins when the updrafts in a convective-type 
cloud can no longer support the weight of the ice and water 
particles. As the particles begin to fall, they drag the air 
downward, causing a downdraft. This is the beginning of a 
precipitation-induced downdraft. Figure 1 illustrates the 
microburst (Rauber, 2002). The downward motions are 
strengthened when air from outside the cloud is mixed with 
saturated air of the cloud. As the moist air descends through 
the cloud and eventually below the cloud deck, evaporation 
of the water particles further cools the air and increases the 
downward motion. In addition, snow melts at lower 
elevations, contributing to the cooling of the air and the 
strength of the downdraft. Ifthe cloud bases are high enough 
and the air beneath the cloud dry enough, rapid cooling 
takes place, resulting in strong, downward-rushing air. 
Because of the lack of abundant moisture, much of the 
precipitation evaporates before it reaches the ground (called 
virga). However, in the dry microburst, the air continues to 
rush downward, striking the ground at speeds approaching 
25 knots-in some cases, wind speeds may approach 100 
knots! The only evidence that a microburst may be 
occurring is blowing dust on the ground beneath the cloud. 
Once the air reaches the ground, the wind spreads outward 
radially and will often curl upward along its outer boundary. 
lf the winds are strong enough, the air will curl upward and 
back over the outward rushing air. An aircraft that 
encounters a headwind of 40 knots with a microburst may 
expect a total shear of 80 knots across the entire microburst 
and the direction may reverse 180 degrees across the 
centerline of the microburst. Amazingly, the conditions just 
described, from the initial downdraft to the fmal dissipation 
of the microburst, can happen within 10 minutes. 
Unfortunately, with the speed at which microbursts occur, 
pilots have little time to react once their aircraft encounters 
that fmt gust (Lawyer, 200 1). 
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Figure 1 .  The Microburst Model 
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Impact 01 Low-Level Windshear on 
Commercial Aviation 
Wind shear! Now that's a subject that we can all 
look at again. It's been the number one weather killer in 
aviation. In the last twenty years, over 650 deaths took place 
in commercial aviation alone, due to wind shears (Miner, 
' 2000). U.S. commercial aviation deaths associated with 
wind shear accidents have dropped as a result of training 
pilots to handle wind shear and the installation of the first 
operational Doppler radar in 1992. Commercial airline 
deaths associated with wind shear are summarized in table 
1 (Rozas, 2002). 1 
But making the decision to take off or land in spite 
of a wind shear alert is left up to the pilot in command. That 
was the case in Little Rock, Ark., in June 1999, when an 
Table 1. Summary of deaths associated with windshear 
Deaths 
-1 
American Airlines crew decided to land despite two wind 
shear warnings given by air traffic controllers. The plane, 
which was carrying 139 passengers and six crewmembers, 
skidded off the runway, broke apart and caught fire. Eleven 
people died, and 87 were injured. The airport did not have 
a Doppler radar system, but the NTSB determined that 
although wind shear was a factor, pilot error caused the 
accident. Many airlines now mandate their pilots not land 
or take off when a wind shear advisory is issued. Pilots 
today will often delay a flight's takeoff to wait out wind 
shear, which usually lasts between five and 15 minutes, or 
will circle the airport until the danger has passed (Rozas, 
2002). 
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PREVENTING LOW-LEVEL WINDSHEAR 
MISHAPS 
Low-Level Windshear Alert Svstem(LLWAS) 
Although pilots had for years described encounters 
with sudden downdrafts and quickchanging head winds and 
tail winds during even light thunderstorms, the term wind 
hear was not attributed to a major airplane crash until 1975. 
Even then, researchers were far fiom an understanding of its 
true danger. That year, Eastern Airlines Flight 66 crashed 
while landing during a thunderstorm at John F. Kennedy 
International Airport in New York, killing 1 12 people. The 
flight had taken off fiom New Orleans. ,Meteorologists 
studying the crash determined that a previously unknown 
phenomenon had pushed the Boeing 727 out of the sky. 
They named it wind shear. Still, scientists didn't know how 
to detect or avoid wind shear (Rozas, 2002). 
Afier the 1975 crash, the Federal Aviation 
Administration began developing equipment to signal 
changes in wind, the first of which was called Low-Level 
Wind Shear -Alert System, or LLWAS. The first 
technological breakthrough in windshear sensing occurred 
in 1976 with the Low Level Windshear Alerting System 
(LLWAS). The LLWAS was installed at 1 10 FAA towered 
airports between 1977 and 1987(Meyer, 1999). This system 
of anemometers is placed around the airport with a computer 
comparing the wind speed and direction of all the 
anemometers every second. When different values of 
direction or speed are sensed, the tower is notified 
automatically for voice dissemination to aircrews. The fmt 
generation of LLWAS had six sensors, but that was found 
to be inadequate since microbursts slipped in-between the 
wind gauges. Wind differences of 13 knots fiom one sensor 
to another triggered an alert to air traffic controllers, who 
then relayed the information to pilots in arrival and 
departure phases of flight. The next two generations 
increased the number of sensors and their location. The 
latest version has up to sixteen wind sensors at the airports. 
Forty-one airports in the CONUS use this system including 
Colorado Springs, Omaha, Shreveport, and other joint-use 
fields (Miner, 2000). 
But the system had flaws. It could not predict wind 
shear, but merely told pilots when it was detected. It also 
had a high rate of false alarms, experts say. Few pilots were 
convinced that wind shear was something always to be 
avoided. "I can remember back in the old days, the pilots 
would just bore straight ahead and go through it," says 
Leonard Parmley, the New Orleans International Airport 
tower control chief. "There was some talk in magazines and 
among the pilots about wind shear, but it wasn't something 
that kept the pilots fiom going through." In 1982, only 60 
JAAER, Winter 2005 
of the nation's 500 commercial airports employed the 
LLWAS devices. Most airfields still relied on simple wind 
cones to measure wind direction or anemometers to measure 
wind speed. At the time of the Pan Am crash, New Orleans 
International had LLWAS, the most current equipment 
available. But in its investigation of the crash, the National 
Transportation Safety Board determined that the LLWAS 
was not advanced enough to detect the microburst that 
brought the Pan Am flight down. "The probable cause of 
the accident was the airplane's encounter during the liftoff 
and initial climb phase of flight with a microburst-induced 
wind shear, ... the effects of which the pilot would have had 
difficulty recognizing and reacting to in time," the NTSB 
report said. "Contributing to the accident was the limited 
capability of current ground-based, low-level wind shear 
detection technology to provide definitive guidance for 
controllers and pilots for use in avoiding low-level wind 
shear encounters." The Pan Am crash generated momentum 
for an attack on the wind shear problem (Rozas, 2002). 
The FAA turned to researchers with the National 
Center for Atmospheric Research, which had been 
conducting wind shear experiments. "At that point, the 
FAA jumped in (in) a major way," says Dr. John McCarthy, 
one of the primary researchers on the project. He is now 
manager of science and technical development at the Naval 
Research Laboratory. Researchers tweaked the LLWAS, 
adding more detectors and increasing the probability of 
detection of wind shear (Rozas, 2002). 
Today modem Vaisala's MIDAS IV LLWAS (low- 
level windshear alert system) allows air traffic control 
(ATC) personnel at airports to warn pilots when low-level 
windshear penetrates the runway corridors so that 
appropriate evasive action can be taken, improving safety 
and operating efficiency. The ground-based system 
simultaneously detects low-level windshear and microburst 
events in the runway corridors and gives audio and visual 
alerts to ATC and other airport personnel. MIDAS IV 
LLWAS constantly collects wind data fiom sensors placed 
along the runway. A typical LLWAS sensor suite will 
include a Vaisala Wind Transmitter, a Vaisala Ultrasonic 
Wind Sensor, and also will include a central display unit 
(CDU) and workstation displays. Using the CDU, the 
MIDAS IV LLWAS processes wind data using the Phase3 
windshear algorithm, developed for the FAA by the 
National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR). If 
windshear and microburst threshold values are exceeded, the 
system generates alerts and warnings to workstations used 
by air traffic controllers, weather obse~ers/forecasters and 
maintenance personnel. The MIDAS IV LLWAS gives ATC 
personnel enough advance warning to adjust patterns and 
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taxiing queues, estimates headwind loss or gain, accurately 
determines where wind shear will be encountered and cuts 
down the probability of false alerts to under 10% (Vaisala's 
MIDAS IV LLWAS, 2003). 
Next Generation Radar (NEXRAD) 
Still, experts knew the aviation industry needed more 
than just state-of-the-art weather sensors. They needed a tool 
to predict the conditions that create wind shear. Researchers 
turned to a weather observation system being used by the 
National Weather Service since the 1970s called NEXRAD, 
for Next Generation Radar. "We had a hunch that we could 
use that equipment to detect wind shear," McCarthy says. 
The radar, renamed Terminal Doppler Weather Radar, and 
often referred to simply as Doppler, reads an echo from dust 
particles in storm clouds to determine the speed and 
direction of wind. Scientists began testing it at Denver's 
Stapleton International Airport and found they were able to 
detect 98 percent of wind shears, McCarthy says. But it 
would be another decade before the system would be 
deployed at major airports. Delays in the development and 
federal financing of the project, as well as hiccups in land 
ownership and questions in some communities about the 
environmental impact of the radars, which must be placed at 
least five miles from the airport, slowed the process. The 
first prototype Doppler system was tested in 1988 at the 
National Center for Atmospheric Research's facility in 
Denver. Later that year, the government awarded a $1 80 
million contract to Raytheon Co. for the installation of 47 
Doppler radars. The number was later changed to 46. The 
first operational Doppler was installed at the FAA Technical 
Facility in Atlantic City, N.J., in 1992. New Orleans 
received the TDWR, as the system is known, in 1996. The 
cost of the radars, about $8 million per airport, made them 
too expensive to be placed at all airports, FAA officials said. 
Roland Herwig, spokesman for the FAA, said cost-benefit 
analysis is used to determine which airports get TDWR. The 
analysis involves many variables, including airport location, 
weather environment, and number of landings and takeoffs 
per year and the cost of the TDWR (Rozas, 2002). 
Training The Pilots 
Every year, about 1 1,000 airline pilots hone their 
skills in 35 simulators that cost up to $17 million each and 
represent the greatest collection of advanced airline training 
equipment in the world. Military pilots, including the crew 
6om the president's Air Force One, also practice at Denver's 
virtual airport. The flight conditions are as varied as the 
world's airports and weather. The simulators are exact 
replicas of every jet cockpit, with computerized images and 
sounds that match what pilots will experience on the ground 
and in the air. Sophisticated hydraulics create the sensation 
of real flight. Hit a devastating wind shear and you feel the 
series ofjolts and change in air speed as the computer calls 
out "Wind shear! Wind shear!" If a landing gear collapses, 
the cockpit drops. "The scenarios we use in the simulators 
represent 6 million possible combinations of events and 
conditions," said J.D. Whitlatch, vice president of pilot 
standards and training for United Airlines. There is no way 
we could train flight crews for that many experiences in a 
real airplane."(Williamson, 1998, p. 2) "The scenarios we 
show are not fictional; they actually happened somewhere," 
said Lew Kosich, a B777 fleet captain (Williamson, 1998, 
p. 2). For example, the microburst that downed a Delta 
Airlines Lockheed L-101 1 in Dallas / Fort Worth in 1985 is 
among the scenarios. By practicing flying through the 
simulated storm, pilots learn how to respond to conditions 
that have claimed the lives of others. At koughly half the 
price of a Boeing 737 jet, the simulators are "expensive to 
buy but cheaper than planes to operate. Still, an hour in a 
777 simulator is far from cheap, roughly $1,200 
(Williamson, 1998). 
After the Pan Am crash in 1982, the FAA studied 
how pilots were trained to handle wind shear. After the 
Dallas crash, the U.S. Department of Transportation 
awarded a $1.8 million contract to Boeing Co. to develop a 
training program to help pilots cope with wind shear, and 
the FAA required all commercial airlines pilots to master the 
program. "Pilots are trained to look for and anticipate 
possible wind shear conditions, something that was unheard 
of before the Pan Am crash," says John Mazer, spokesman 
for the Air Line Pilots Association (Rozas, 2002, p. 5). 
"We'd go back for training twice a year, and at the end of 
the training we'll just practice wind shears over and over 
again," says Zander, a retired United Airlines pilot. "With 
the proper technique, most are survivable. Some are just not. 
I can tell you it was nice sometimes to be in a simulator 
that's bolted to the ground"(Rozas, 2002, p. 5). The decision 
to take off or land in spite of a wind shear alert is left up to 
the pilot. Many airlines now require that their pilots not land 
or take off when a wind shear advisory is issued. Pilots 
today will often delay a flight's takeoff to wait out wind 
shear, which usually lasts between five and 15 minutes, or 
will circle the airport until the danger has passed (Rozas, 
2002). 
Future Technology 
The FAA is focusing its future aviation technology 
on integrating the equipment airports and airlines already 
use, in order to better predict not only wind shears but also 
all potentially dangerous weather. Weather accounted for 3 1 
percent of the nation's airline carrier crashes between 1989 
and 1999, according to the NTSB (Rozas, 2002). 
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The Integrated Terminal Weather System is a 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) system that brings 
together meteorological data from a wide variety of 
previously deployed sensors. The ITWS, available at eight 
airports, processes these data and provides highly distilled 
automated weather products to increase airport safety and 
e%ciency. Primarily FAA personnel who control aircraft or 
plan traffic flow use the resulting weather information. 
Secondarily, the information is used by airline dispatchers 
and by meteorologists at the center weather service units. 
The ITWS was developed at MITLincoln Laboratory and 
currently is in full-scale development ,by Raytheon. 
MITILincoln Laboratory operates functional prototype 
ITWS systems at Orlando, Memphis, DallasIFort Worth, 
and New York City, providing real-time weather support. 
The FAA plans to install a total of 34 ITWS systems during 
the next two years to service 45 major airports (Cole, 2000). 
The ITWS uses the Terminal Doppler Weather Radar 
(TDWR) and the latest version of the LLWAS working 
together to provide automatic alerts to aircraft (Miner, 
2000). Examples of the products provided by the initial 
deployment are microbust detections and predictions, gust 
front detections and wind shifts (Cole, 2000). 
The tower is still the primary means of 
communicating windshear warnings at civilian airports. 
Controllers have a display in the tower which shows the 
windshear and microbust warnings for specific runways. 
The warnings are generated automatically. If there is a 
limitation to these systems, it is that the tower controller is 
the only source of the information for the pilot. Terminal 
controllers do not have access to the information. For the 
last three years, airlines have been using a VHF data-linking 
program to have text and graphic information ofthe terminal 
area broadcast directly from the TDWR, and ITWS systems 
to the flight deck. The textual description of the weather 
within 5 NM of the airport is automatically updated every 
minute. The radar can produce a graphic (using letters and 
numbers) every five minutes. Direct interface between the 
sensors and the flight deck looks to be the future when it 
comes to sensing windshear (Miner, 2000). 
The system is designed to give highly accurate 
forecasts of expected weather conditions for a 200-mile 
radius, for up to 20 minutes into the future. The FAA plans 
to buy 37 such systems to cover the airports that have 
Doppler and would install them between now and 2007, but 
those dates depend on congressional financing (Rozas, 
2002). 
Airlines 
The FAA required airliners' radar to include 
windshear alert systems by the end of 1995 (Mconnaughey, 
2002). American Airlines has selected Honeywell to provide 
predictive windshear radar systems for installation on 
selected current and future American Airlines aircrafl 
(Coventry, 2001). 
To give pilots advance warning of windshear, 7 1 
airlines around the world have installed AlliedSignal's RDR- 
4B windshear radar system in its 4,016 aircraft (Melyrnuka, 
1998). AlliedSignal's system is a predictive radar, which 
detects windshear up to five miles in front ofthe aircraft and 
warns flight crews before the aircraft enters a potentially 
dangerous windshear event. The system gives flight crews 
30 to 60 seconds of warning time before encountering 
potentially damaging windshear. In contrast, most radar 
systems are reactive systems that tell the pilot when the 
plane has encountered Adshear - the warning can be as 
little as a few seconds. Here's how the system works: A 
Doppler radar antenna in the nose of the airplane sends out 
signals that measure the motion of raindrops moving toward 
and away from the aircraft. Those signals bounce back to a 
receiver in the plane, which interprets the data and displays 
the green, yellow and red weather patterns on a monitor in 
the cockpit. The monitor allows pilots to see the location 
and size of hazardous windshear and storms (Lorek, 1994). 
THEBUREAUCRACYANDDELAYS 
The FAA provides oversight for the largest, busiest 
and most complex aviation system in the world. As part of 
its mission, the FAA and its staff of 49,000 operate and 
maintain our nation's air traffic system, orchestrating the 
take-off, landing and routing of 93,000 aircraft a day. The 
FAA also regulates aviation safety and security, which 
entails standard setting for, and oversight of, commercial 
airlines, private aircraft, aircraft manufacturers and the air 
traffic system (U.S. Newswire, 2000). 
Why does it sometimes take disaster or the passage 
of years for the FAA to take significant action? It is 
embedded in the conflicted nature of the FAA. Serving two 
masters, the agency not only is charged with numuing the 
aviation industry but also must ensure the safety of the 
flying public. Whenever the FAA considers changes in 
safety and equipment regulations, the agency must balance 
safety against the cost to airlines. According to records and 
interviews, the result can be delays in addressing safety 
problems and more accidents related to them. Deadly delays 
have occurred in part because a law requires the FAA to 
justify the cost of implementing proposed safety measures 
by showing that enough lives will be saved (Brazil, 1994). 
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Joe Cox, a scientist who directed the FAA's $4 
million windshear project, said the equipment could have 
been developed for use by 1982 at a cost of about W8 
million. He blamed the FAA's abandonment of the in- 
cockpit systems in part on resistance from the Air Transport 
Association, an industry group representing major airlines 
(Boeing Co. to install windshear equipment in jetliners, 
1986). 
A four-month Los Angeles Times review of 
government documents revealed that in some cases years 
have passed and lives have been lost before the FAA acted 
on safety problems, although the pgency had long been 
aware of the hazards (Brazil, 1994). 
CONCLUSION 
The Pan Am Flight 759 on July9,1982 remains the 
nation's worst accident caused by windshear, partly because 
it focused attention on the problem, said John McCarthy of 
the Naval Research Laboratory in Monterey, California 
(Mconnaughey, 2002 p. 2). 
- The Federal Aviation Administration already was 
studying windshear. The crash got everyone--government, 
business and science--working hard together to find ways to 
avoid similar accidents, McCarthy said. "We thought we 
could decrease the number of windshear accidents by 60 
percent," he said (Mcomaughey, 2002 p. 2). Instead, 
windshear has downed only two airlines since then: the 
Delta Air Lines crash that killed 137 on Aug. 2, 1985, at 
Dallas-Fort Worth Airport and the July 2,1994, USAir crash 
in Charlotte, N.C, which killed 37. We've gone from a 
hazard that caused hundreds of deaths in the '70s and '80s to 
essentially, knock on wood, we're not having them 
anymore," McCarthy says (Rozas, 2002, p. 6). "At the time 
we started this work. we never dreamed it would be as 
successfbl as it has been. "We obviously can't say that 
there won't be another wind-shear accident, but we've gotten 
a whole lot better than we ever imagined, "McCarthy said 
(Mco~aughey, 2002 p. 2). Wind shear has continued to 
cause dozens of accidents and incidents; it is mentioned in 
an average of 25 National Transportation Safety Board 
reports a year from 1983 through 2001. But the vast 
majority were nonfatal. They also are mostly small, private 
planes (Mcomaughey, 2002). 
Many lives have been saved because of the 
reduction, if not elimination, of potential airline crashes 
caused by dangerous wind shear conditions on takeoff and 
landings. These saved lives are the result of training pilots 
on the dangers of microbursts and the installation of Doppler 
radars and LLWAS at major airports across the United 
States to warn pilots when microbursts are present. Just as 
important is the airlines predictive radar, which gives flight 
crews 30 to 60 seconds of warning time. In the future it is 
critical that pilot training programs continue and that there 
is a progressive oversight activity to monitor the 
performance of the TDWRs and the operational microburst 
detection and forecast algorithms (Wilson, 200 1). 
Congressional officials have suggested that the 
nation's skies would be safer and more efficient if the day- 
today air traffic control operations were taken away from 
the FAA so it can focus on airline safety issues. At the heart 
of the issue lies FAA's conflicting mandates: to ensure the 
welfare ofthe flying public but also to nurture the economic 
welfare of the aviation industry (Brazil, 1994). .) 
Wayne L. Golding holds an MS. in Counseling and Guidance fiom Troy State University and a B.S. in Meteorology from Texas 
A&M University. He retired fiom the Air Force in 1995 after 36 years of service, as a weather officer .He is currently an Assistant 
Professor of Applied Aviation Sciences at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. 
Page 42 
-- 
JAAER, Winter 2005 
8




Aerospace Technolom, Vol. 71, Issue 4,329.Airports Find New Weather Technology Tools Help Reduce Delays. (2001, 
" May 22). World Airvort Week, Vol. 8, Issue 19, 1. 
American Airlines Chooses Rockwell Collins Avionics for New Boeing 737 and 777 Aircraft. ( I  997, Dec 1 1). 
PR Newswire, 1. 
Associated Press. ( 1997, Jan 29). Crew of fatal flight 10 16 made errors, pilot testifies. ATC Market Revort, Vol. 10, 
Issue 24,9 
AWI to begin installing display system in Boston. (2003, Apr 25). ATC Market Revort, Vol. 1, Issue 12,4. 
Bell, T. (1986, Aug 25). Windshear detectors already in place, but research into phenomenon goes on. Houston Chronicle, 9 
Boeing Co. to install windshear equipment in jetliners. (1986, Febl 1). Seattle Times, C 4. 
Brazil. (1994, December 12). FAA must strike balance between safety, cost issues. Los Angeles Times, A-I. 
Broadston, B. (1999, May). Meeting a microburst. Flvine; Safetv, Vol. 55, lssue 5,21. 
Business Brief -- AlliedSignal Inc.: Windshear Detection System Ordered by Continental Air. (1 993, May 27). 
Wallstreet Journal, 1. 
Case bears similarities to other landing accidents in foul weather. (1999, Jun 7). Air Safetv Week, Vol. 13, Issue 23, 1. 
Chatelain, K. (1 992, Jul5). Remembering the crash-Ten years later residents haunted by disaster. Times-Picawe, A 1. 
Clark, P. (1998, May 13). Eye on the sky. The Washinrrton Post, H03. 
Cole, R. (2000, Aug). Improving RUC-1 wind estimates by incorporating near-real-time aircraft. Weather and Forecasting, Vol. 
15, Issue 4,447460. 
Crash Spurs Changes from Cockpit to Corporate Headquarters. (2000, May 22). Air Safetv Week, Vol. 14, Issue 2 1, 1 .- 
Croft, J. (2002, Aug 26). Taming Loss-of-Control: Solutions Are Elusive Industry and government reevaluate efforts to curb 
this major contributor to airline accidents and fatalities. Aviation Week & Svace Technology, Vol. 157, Issue 9, 
50-52. 
Decision to Land in Thunderstorm Likely to be Central Point of Crash Investigation- Case bears similarities to other landing 
accidents in foul weather. (1999, Jun7). Air Safetv Week, Vol. 13, Issue 23, 1. 
Hughes, D. (1999, Oct 25). Pilots see shrinking margin for error. Aviation week & Svace Technolow, Vol. 151, 
Issue 17. 73-74. 
Grose, V. (1995, Apr). Your next airline flight: Worth the risk. Risk Management, Vol. 42, lssue 4, 47. 
Gwinn, D. (2001, Aug). Going down. Plane and Pilot, Vol. 37, Issue 8,60-65. 
JAAER, Winter 2005 Page 43 
9
Golding: Low-Level Windshear and Its Impact on Airlines
Published by Scholarly Commons, 2005
Low-Level Windshear 
Hilkevitch, J. (1999, Jun 4). Fatigue studied in Little Rock crash investigators hunt reasons why pilot flew through storm. Chicago 
Tribune, 3. 
Impact on Schedules of a Severe-Weather Avoidance Rule Largely Unknown, But Could be Determined. (2000, Mar 27). 
Air Safetv Week, Vol. 14, Issue 12, 1. 
Industry briefs. (2001, Sep 5). Airlines Industrv Information, 1. 
Johnson, G. (1 999, Jun 3). Peril at ground level. Oran~e County Register, A09. 
Lawyer D. (2001, Dec). Microburst. An aviator's worst nightmare. Flying Safetv, Vol. 57, Issue 12,4-9. 
Legacy of Flight 759. (2002, Jul 8);Times-Picawne, B.04. 
Lorek, L. (1994, Dec 1). Airlines get new windshear warning system. Times-Picawne, G14. 
Mconnaughey, J. (2002, Jul7). Wind-shear detection improves since deadly flight. Advocate, 3B. 
Mammana, D. (1998, Jun 21). Weather Almanac. N e w d a ~  A47. 
Melymuka, K. (1998, Jun 8). 10 years of heroes. Com~uterworld, Vol32, Issue 23,71-74. 
Mconnaughey, J. (2002, Jul7). Wind-shear detection improves since deadly flight. Advocate, 3-B. 
McWilliarns, B. (2001, Aug 2). Aircraft's deadly new enemy is revealed. 32. 
Meyer, D. (1999, January 10- 15). Study of Network Expansion LLWAS (LLWAS-NE). 
Paper presented at the American Meteorological Society79th Annual Conference, Dallas,Texas. 
Minor, T. (2000, May). Judgement versus windshear: An epic poem with a heavy weather moral. Mobilitv Forum, Vol, 9, 
Issue 3,27-33. 
NTSB Wants Wind Unit Upgrade After MD-80 Runway Incident. (2001,Aug 7). m, Vol. 345, Issue 26,2. 
Probe of US Airways crash could lead to airline changes. (2003, Jan 12). Knieht Ridder Tribune Business News, 1. 
Raytheon Terminal Weather System Gets FAA Contractor Acceptance (2001, Nov 22). 
Rauber, R. (2002). Severe Weather and Hazards. 
Rozas, A. (2002, Jul8). Twenty years after Pan Am crash, wind shear danger low. Newhouse News Service, 1-12. 
Rozas, A. (2002, Jul7). The Kenner Crash. Times-PicayuneS A01. 
Skilling, T. (2000, Mar 1) Ask Tom why. Chicapo Tribune, 12. 
United Flight simulators, largest training site in world. Rockv Mountain News, 1 B. 
U.S. Newswire. (2000,December 7). White House report on air traffic control reform. 
Vaisala's MIDAS IV LLWAS. (2003, Mar 21). ATC Market Re~ort, Vol. 1, Issue 7,6. 
Greensboro News Record, B2. 
Page 44 JAAER, Winter 2005 
10




Vincent, B. (2000, Feb 2 1 ). News Briefs. Air Safety Week, Vol. 14, Issue 7, 1. 
Visser, H. (1 999). Windshear recovery using thrust vectoring. Aircraft Engineering. 
Weaver, B. (2001, Mar). In like a lion. Scientific Comvutin~ & Instrumentation, Vol. 18, Issue 4, 14. 
Williamson, R. (1998, May 26). Denver's virtual aviators Stapleton Airport is home to Wilson, J. (2001, Jan). The discovery of 
the downburst: T. T. Fujita's contribution. Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, Vol. 82, Issue 1,49-62. 
Windshear warnings preceded fatal crash Storm's winds hard to gauge. (1 999, Jun 4). Colorado Springs Gazette, A 1 .  
JAAER, Winter 2005 Page 45 
11
Golding: Low-Level Windshear and Its Impact on Airlines
Published by Scholarly Commons, 2005
12
Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education & Research, Vol. 14, No. 2 [2005], Art. 8
https://commons.erau.edu/jaaer/vol14/iss2/8
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/jaaer.2005.1530
